Is Ozzieball Working, in Terms of One-Run Games?

I was reading an old Bill James article on the use of One-Run game records as a basis of managerial evaluation and, of course, wondered how it applied to the White Sox. The 2004 White Sox, under manager Ozzie Guillen, finished with a record of 28-18 in one-run games last season, which gave them a winning percentage of .609. What's interesting about the James article is that he comes up with a formula to determine a team's expected winning percentage based on the Pythagorem formula for winning percentage based on runs scored and runs allowed. Of course, there is some modification, and you can read the details in the article.

So, the White Sox, who scored 865 runs and allowed 831, should have finished with a record of 84-78. They ended up 83-79, a game under their expected record. Using James' equation, their expected winning percentage in one-run games was .509, so their .609 winning percentage in one-run games well exceeded expectations. In terms of games, the 2004 White Sox, based on the Pythagorem formula, and the 46 one-run games they played in, should have won 23.4 games. They won 28, so the exceeded expectations by 4.6 games.

Let's look back at 2003, Jerry Manuel's last season. The White Sox were 86-76. They were expected to finish 88-74. In one-run games, they were 18-22, a winning percentage of .450. Based on the Pythagorem formula, their expected winning percentage was .522. In 40 games, they should have won 20.9 games, so they underachieved by 2.9 games. At first glance, it seems as if there was a distinct improvement between the two managers. But not so fast. James concludes that, statistically, winning a lot of one-run games has a persistance of zero, which basically means it's luck. For his career, Manuel was 123-124 in one-run games, a winning percentage of .498. Based on the Pythagorem formula, he should have had a winning percentage of .505. In terms of games, that means Manuel lost 1.7 more games than he was expected to. All things considered, it's a pretty slight deviation, and certainly nothing out of the norm.

James also tries to find what identifiable characteristics can be found in teams they win more one-run games vs. teams that lose more one-run games. He uses the top 50 and worst 50 teams in one-run games since 1950 for his study. Here are the results:

The 50 teams which did well in one-run games had more stolen bases (96-92 on average), more sacrifice bunts (71-67), more complete games (35-31), more saves (34-30), issued fewer walks (513-531), drew more walks (526-520) and had a better ERA (3.77 to 3.91).

The 50 teams which did poorly in one-run games hit more home runs (127-117), scored more runs (674-658), had a higher slugging percentage (.386-.380), a lower on-base percentage (.325-.323), used more relief pitchers (278-257), threw more wild pitches (47-44) and had more balks (8-7). They were more likely to play in hitter's parks (park factors 100.3 vs. 98.5).

Looking at that, it becomes obvious to see why Ozzie and Kenny want guys who gan get on base, move runners over, steal bases, and of course, a better pitching staff. But, although there are some tendancies in teams that win one-run games, it's to a very small degree. More or less, winning one-run games all comes down to luck.

But how much of losing one-run games is based on luck? You'd think the same as winning them, but that's not entirely accurate. James has also found that losing a lot of one-run games is not completely meaningless. There are enough teams that perform well under expectations one season, and then do the same next season to show that it's possible a team, or a manager, can be attributed to how many one-run games they lose.

There's also something else to look at. James also has come up with an equation to determine how many one-run games a team is expected to play in a given season. The formula is .63 divided by the square root of runs per game in the team's context (runs scored+runs allowed divided by 162 games). So, in terms of the White Sox in 2004, based on their runs scored and allowed, they were expected to have 19.5% of their games played be determined by one run, or approx. 31 games. They actually played in 46 one-run games, or 28.4%.

This has some significance, and I've been trying to figure out why the White Sox played in so many more one-run games than they were expected to (15 more, to be precise). My first inclination was the bullpen. In 2004, the bullpen had a 21-21 record, with a 4.31 ERA. But that doesn't seem to have any correlation to the number of one-run games. (Interesting side note: Ozzie used his bullpen less than any other AL manager. They only logged 424.1 innings of work this season.) This question doesn't seem to have an answer at the moment.

In the end, there isn't really any way to determine if Ozzieball is responsible for the marked increase in the one-run games record. Remember, in 2000, Manuel led the Sox to a 28-18 record in one-run games. The difference there is that they won the division that year, and they didn't this year, and in the end that's the only way fans will evaluate managers. One-run games, more or less, come down to luck. As far as if Ozzie's "motivational tactics" are producing more wins in close games, we'll have to wait and see. Right now he's up 4.6 games. But he could just as easily be down 5 next season.